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  Despite interest in the potential of the welfare system as a tool to affect marriage 
behaviors among low-income women, little is known about how welfare participation affects 
decisions to marry. We employ an event history approach to examine transitions to marriage 
over a five-year period among mothers who have had a non-marital birth. We find that welfare 
participation under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program (TANF) reduces the 
likelihood of transitioning to marriage (hazard ratio is .67, p < .01), but only while the mother is 
receiving welfare. Once the mother leaves TANF, past receipt has little effect on marriage. We 
project that over an 18-year period, TANF participation results in at most a 4 to 5 percentage 
point reduction in marriage and a 16-month delay in marriage. We infer that the negative 
association between TANF participation and marriage reflects temporary economic disincentives 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 
1996 was designed to reduce reliance on welfare, make fathers more accountable, and increase 
marriage. The last goal has been prominently featured in debates over welfare reauthorization. 
The belief that there is a causal link from welfare to family structure is rooted in two distinct 
perspectives. The first is that the welfare system can affect marriage behaviors through economic 
incentives. The other is that reliance on public assistance and single parenthood are both part of a 
“tangle of pathologies” (to borrow from Moynihan 1965) afflicting poor women. Both 
perspectives are reflected in current policy debates.  
Despite widespread speculation about the links between the welfare system and marriage 
behaviors of low-income women, most of the research in this area has focused on the effects of 
welfare policies on marriage. Little is known about how welfare participation affects decisions 
to marry, particularly after welfare spells have ended. Many prior investigations have shown that 
the two behaviors are negatively related, but few have focused specifically on the extent to which 
the experience of participating in the welfare system affects the likelihood or timing of marriage. 
In this paper, we employ an event history approach to examine the effects of welfare 
participation on entry into marriage among mothers who have had a non-marital birth. We 
estimate the effects of both current and past participation and project effects over the life course. 
We also explore potential mechanisms including selection, financial disincentives, changes in 
values, and stigma. 
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Background and significance 
There has been much interest among researchers and politicians, dating back at least 25 
years, in how the welfare system affects family structure. Most studies in this area have focused 
on the effects of welfare policies on female headship, marriage, and cohabitation. Others have 
investigated the effects of various policies on non-marital fertility, which affects eligibility for 
welfare. The evidence from studies conducted after 1990 suggests that, on balance, welfare 
discourages marriage and encourages fertility.
1 However, the effects tend to be small and often 
are significant only for whites (see Blank 2002; Moffitt 1998; Peters, Plotnick and Jeong 2001; 
Ratcliffe, McKernan and Rosenberg 2002). For example, Moffitt, Reville, and Winkler (1998) 
found that a $100 increase in the monthly benefit level reduces the probability of marriage by at 
most 5 percentage points. A review of experimental studies, primarily from pre-PRWORA 
waivers, indicates that welfare policies have little effect on marriage (Gennetian and Knox 
2003). Another recent review projects that, overall, changes in welfare rules under PRWORA 
that replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with time limited Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) will unlikely result in large changes in marriage behavior 
(Peters et al. 2001). 
The fact that marriage does not appear to be highly sensitive to welfare rules does not 
preclude the possibility that there are sizable welfare participation effects. Being on welfare may 
delay marriage (perhaps because of actual or perceived eligibility criteria counting the earnings 
of spouses), but have little effect on the likelihood that welfare participants will marry after 
spells end.
2 Conversely, welfare participation could have small effects on individuals’ marriage 
                                                 
1 The post-1990 studies tend to be more methodologically rigorous than earlier studies. 
2 There could actually be positive effects of having recently been on welfare on marriage if decisions to marry are 
postponed until the welfare spells end. 
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behaviors that translate into sizeable effects only over a long period of time.
3 In this paper, we 
explore a number of potential mechanisms by which welfare participation could result in short-
term (occurring while participants receive welfare) and long-term (persisting after welfare 
participation ends) effects on marriage.  
 
Evidence of participation effects 
Many previous studies present estimates of associations between welfare participation 
and marriage. However, most treat welfare participation (usually at any time during the year 
prior to an interview) as a control variable in analyses focusing on other determinants of 
marriage. Some studies have examined the effect of growing up in a welfare dependent 
household as a child, rather than as an adult, on marriage (e.g., Manning and Smock 1995). Most 
studies with a focus on welfare participation find weak or insignificant associations with 
marriage (e.g., Lichter et al. 1992, Brien 1997, Smock and Manning 1997). However, these 
studies did not distinguish between effects of current and past welfare participation.  
As far as we know, only two studies have attempted to isolate current or past effects. 
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Vartanian and McNamara (2004) 
estimated effects of AFDC participation on being married 10, 15, and 20 years later. They found 
a negative association between participation in AFDC for more than 2 years and being married 
15 years later, a positive association between AFDC participation for less than 2 years and being 
married 20 years later, and no other significant associations. The inconsistent results, small 
sample sizes, and possible selection issues make it difficult to draw inferences from that study 
about the effects of past welfare participation on marriage. 
                                                 
3 The long-term effects may not be captured by policy effect studies that tend to focus on short time frames.  
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Using 1989 to 2000 data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 
Fitzgerald and Ribar (2005) found sizeable negative effects of current welfare participation 
(AFDC or TANF) on exits from female headship (the most common pathway being through 
marriage), after controlling for individual and policy measures. By estimating simultaneous 
models of welfare participation and headship, they found that unobserved heterogeneity inflated 
their single equation estimates by about 10 percent. Their estimated effect sizes are substantially 
larger than the associations found in other studies, perhaps reflecting their focus on female 
headship rather than marriage, or more likely, their focus on the effect of being on welfare rather 
than having been on welfare at some point in the recent past. 
Taken together, the Vartanian and Fitzgerald studies suggest that effects of current 
welfare participation are larger than those of past welfare participation. However, a systematic 
exploration of the relative effects of current and past welfare participation requires that the two 
be modeled simultaneously, or at least consistently (using the same data, control variables, and 
model specifications). Additionally, these two studies report findings based primarily on AFDC, 
so their results may not be generalizable to TANF participation in the post-PRWORA 
environment (particularly the Vartanian and McNamara study, which analyzed welfare 
participation that took place decades ago). 
In this study, we use recent data to estimate the effects of both past and current TANF 
participation on marriage among mothers who have had a non-marital birth and use these 
estimates to project total effects of welfare participation over the life course. We also test classes 
of possible explanations of the association between these two behaviors. 
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Determinants of welfare participation and marriage 
Our analyses build on many prior studies of the determinants of welfare participation or 
marriage. As discussed earlier, welfare participation, poverty, and being an unmarried parent are 
highly related. Single women, those who have low levels of education, those who have more 
children to care for, and those who are members of minority groups all are more likely than 
women without these characteristics to be poor and use welfare (Pavetti 1997). Immigrant 
mothers are less likely to rely on welfare than native-born mothers due to eligibility restrictions 
and issues of legal status, but they are more likely to be poor and therefore financially eligible for 
welfare (Tumlin and Zimmerman 2003). 
Zedlewski (2002), using data from the 1997 and 1999 National Survey of America’s 
Families, imputed TANF eligibility status for families and compared characteristics of 
participants and non-participants. Among eligible families, participants had more children, were 
less likely to live with other adults (including partners), had higher rates of physical and mental 
health problems, were less likely to have worked in the past three years, were younger, and were 
more likely to be black and less likely to be Hispanic than non-participants. Reichman et al. 
(2004) conducted a similar analysis of TANF use among urban families with one-year-old 
children and found very similar results.  
Past research has found that local labor markets affect welfare participation (Hoynes 
2000; Fitzgerald 1995; Ribar 2005), as do state welfare (Mead 2000; 2003; Teitler, Reichman 
and Nepomnyaschy 2006), child support (Meyer 1993; Huang, Garfinkel and Waldfogel 2004), 
and Medicaid (Yelowitz 1995) policies.  
Many of the factors that are positively associated with welfare participation are 
negatively associated with marriage. These include race/ethnicity (Lichter, LeClere and 
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McLaughlin 1991; Brien 1997), income and education (Lichter et al., 1992; Oppenheimer 1994; 
Carlson, McLanahan and England 2004) family structure as a child (Avery et al., 1992; Axinn 
and Thornton 1992; South 2001), and health status (Lillard and Panis 1996). Labor and marriage 
markets also appear to affect marriage decisions (Blau, Kahn and Waldfogel 2000; Brien 1997; 
Wood 1995), as do local and state policies (Yelowitz 1998).  
 
Potential explanations for the welfare-marriage association 
We consider several potential explanations of the welfare participation and marriage 
association, each of which would predict either long-term associations (i.e., effects of having 
been on welfare in the past) or only short-term associations (i.e., effects of currently being on 
welfare). These potential explanations are elaborated below and classified in Table 1 by expected 
duration. 
 
Values: Welfare participation may change individuals’ tastes for or attitudes towards work and 
marriage. The notion that reliance on public assistance alters work and family values is one that 
has existed since at least the 1960s. This argument is prevalent in current debates over welfare 
reform (e.g., Horn, 2002). Despite widespread beliefs on the subject, very little research has 
investigated the extent to which welfare participation changes individuals’ values. Studies 
investigating the effects of having lived in a welfare-dependent household as a child on non-
marital fertility have the potential to provide indirect evidence about whether welfare 
participation is associated with negative marriage attitudes. However, the existing research on 
this topic is fraught with methodological problems (see 1995 review article by Corcoran). Thus, 
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whether welfare participation changes family values remains very much an open question, as 
does how long lasting the potential effects would be.  
 
Mental health: Welfare participation may have psychological effects. The experience of relying 
on cash assistance may depress self-esteem or increase stress, leading to difficulties in finding 
partners and maintaining relationships. A number of studies have found associations between 
welfare participation and mental illness (Goodban 1985; Jarrett 1996; Nichols-Casebolt 1986; 
Jayakody and Stauffer 2000; Rainwater 1982), but the directionality has not been established. It 
is even less clear whether welfare participation leads to long-term psychological scarring 
(beyond the recipiency period) or whether the association between welfare participation and 
mental illness is strictly short-term.
4  
There is recent evidence that mental health is strongly associated with marital status 
among mothers of young children who had non-marital births (DeKlyen et al. 2006), although, 
again, the directionality remains unclear. As far as we know, no studies have investigated the 
extent to which a mother’s psychological state mediates the relation between welfare and 
marriage.  
 
Stigma: Welfare participation may project a negative image that reduces participants’ appeal as 
potential marriage partners. Prior research has documented negative perceptions of welfare 
participants, generally (e.g., Klugel and Smith 1986; Rainwater 1982). However, there is no 
evidence that stigma associated with welfare participation translates into reduced marriage 
prospects. Being on welfare may also alter participants’ self-perceptions of marriage worthiness. 
                                                 
4 Petterson and Friel (2001) suggest that the associations between welfare participation and mental illness reflect 
differences in material hardship rather than welfare participation per se.  
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There is evidence that low-income couples strive to achieve economic self-sufficiency before 
entering marital unions (Edin and Kafalas 2005; Gibson, Edin and McLanahan 2005). Thus, 
mothers on TANF may postpone marriage because welfare participation is an incontrovertible 
and highly visible marker (to themselves and to others) of not having achieved that goal. In other 
words, it is proof that they have not met an economic “marriage bar.”  
Welfare participation in the past could also have stigmatizing or “scarlet letter” effects 
and devalue women’s attractiveness as potential marriage partners. There is some evidence that 
prior welfare experience negatively affects employment opportunities and wages (Noonan and 
Heflin 2005), but it is not known whether past welfare participation deters potential marriage 
partners or whether the employment effects of past welfare participation translate to marriage. 
 
Economic disincentives: According to the economic theory of utility maximization, in particular 
Becker’s theory of marriage (Becker 1973; 1974), welfare eligibility rules counting the earnings 
of spouses provide a disincentive to marriage. Since participants may face an immediate loss of 
benefits if they marry, the disincentive is likely to be strongest during welfare spells and thus 
have only a short-term impact. 
 
Selection: Associations between welfare participation and marriage may reflect selection; that is, 
differences in marriage rates of participants and non-participants may be due to unobserved 
characteristics of women associated with both behaviors. Three forms of selection could be 
operating: selection on the basis of socioeconomic characteristics, selection on the basis of 
cultural norms, and selection on the basis of transient disruptions.  
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In terms of socioeconomic selection, Schram (2000) argues that behaviors of welfare 
recipients often reflect responses to poverty rather than welfare participation per se. Unobserved 
differences in social norms or culture could also underlie associations between welfare 
participation and marriage. Some have argued that relying on welfare and placing a low value on 
marriage both originate in a “culture of poverty”
5 or are part of a self-reinforcing “tangle of 
pathologies” that lead to a breakdown of the family.
6 Such arguments suggest that the behaviors 
of others in the community shape normative environments that in turn affect individual decisions 
about reliance on government assistance and family formation. 
The extent to which human capital and cultural forms of selection explain associations 
between welfare participation and marriage can be inferred by comparing the estimated current 
and past welfare participation effects. If the associations entirely reflect either or both of these 
types of selection, the estimates of current and past participation effects would be very similar in 
magnitude. Finding an effect of current participation and none of past participation, however, 
would indicate that the association between welfare participation and marriage is not due to 
either of these forms of selection.  
A third form of selection could affect estimates of current welfare participation without 
affecting estimates of past participation. Transient disruptions in a woman’s social, economic, or 
emotional circumstances may lead her to go on welfare and also affect her immediate marriage 
prospects. For example, she may lose her job and use welfare until she finds other employment. 
Her unemployment status might be a detriment in the marriage market during her period of 
unemployment, which would coincide with her welfare participation. Under such a scenario, the 
circumstances that resulted in both welfare participation and not getting married could explain 
                                                 
5 See Lewis (1968). 
6 See Moynihan (1965). 
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the negative association between current welfare participation and marriage without causing 
associations between past welfare participation and marriage. 
While we cannot test each of the seven mechanisms individually, we can test classes of 
mechanisms by investigating whether effects of welfare participation on marriage exist only in 
the short-term or whether they extend beyond the recipiency period. For example, if we find 
evidence of short- but not long-term effects, we can rule out that welfare participation has lasting 
effects on family values or mental health in more than a transitory manner, as well as that 
socioeconomic or normative selection mechanisms are at play. Finding short- and long-term 
effects that are of similar magnitude would indicate that economic disincentives or short-term 
shocks are not driving the associations between welfare participation and marriage. 
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (hereafter, FF) follows a cohort of 
parents and their newborn children in 20 U.S. cities (located in 15 states). Mothers were 
interviewed in the hospital at the time of their child’s birth (baseline) and over the telephone one 
and three years later.  Baseline interviews were conducted with a probability sample of 3,712 
unmarried mothers and a comparison group of 1,196 married mothers from 1998 to 2000 (see 
Reichman et al. 2001 for details of the research design). Response rates of unmarried mothers 
were 87 percent at baseline, 90 percent at the one year follow-up, 87 percent at three years, and 
84 percent at five years.
7 
  Of the 3,293 mothers who reported that they were unmarried at baseline and who 
completed follow-up interviews at one year, 39 were excluded due to inconsistent or missing 
                                                 
7 The one and three year follow-up response rates are of unmarried mothers who completed baseline interviews and 
were still eligible to participate in the study. The five year response rate is preliminary. 
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reports of marriage dates, 5 because of missing data on TANF spells, and 30 because of missing 
data on other covariates. The remaining 3,219 cases form the sample for the analyses that follow. 
Our outcome of interest is marriage, either to the baby’s father or to someone else. We used 
information from all available survey waves to determine marital status of the mother at each 
month after her baseline interview. 
  We focus on whether TANF participation affects entry into marriage among mothers who 
had non-marital births—a group at high risk for welfare dependence. We used retrospective 
reports of TANF participation dates to construct monthly welfare histories from 1997 until the 
focal child was five years old (during 2003 to 2005). Observations for which there was no 
completed three or five year follow-up interview were right censored at the time of the mother’s 
last interview. The TANF participation dates were used to construct two time-varying measures 
of TANF participation, allowing us to estimate short and long-term effects. The first is a measure 
of current TANF participation, which was coded 1 for months in which the respondent was on 
TANF and 0 for months in which she was not on TANF. The second is a measure of past TANF 
participation, which was coded 1 for any given month if the respondent had been on TANF at 
any time since 1997 but was not currently on TANF, and coded 0 otherwise.
8 When exact TANF 
participation dates were missing, we imputed them based on data from the mothers’ other 
interviews and we assess sensitivity of our results to the imputations. 
We incorporate the following baseline measures that past research, discussed earlier, 
indicates are associated with both with TANF participation and transitions to marriage: mother’s 
race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and other), mother’s 
educational attainment (less than high school, high school or equivalent, or more than high 
                                                 
8 By considering only welfare participation since 1997, we are excluding previous AFDC participation from our 
measure of past participation. It is therefore possible that a mother who relied on AFDC but not on TANF would be 
coded as not having relied on TANF in the past. 
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school), whether the mother lived with both of her biological parents at age 15, and the mother’s 
health (excellent, very good or good, compared to fair or poor). We also include the following 
measures, all from baseline, which are associated with welfare participation or marriage and 
possibly both: the mother’s age (whether she was at least 20 years old), the mother’s nativity 
(U.S.-born vs. foreign-born), whether the mother was cohabiting with the baby’s father, parity 
(whether the child was the mother’s first), whether the birth was covered by Medicaid, and 
whether the mother attended religious services at least several times per month. We also included 
city fixed effects to control for state policies and other characteristics of mothers’ cities or states 




  We employ event history analysis to model the effect of TANF participation on the 
likelihood and timing of marriage. Specifically, we estimate Cox proportional hazard models in 
which duration is measured in months from the child’s birth. All baseline unmarried mothers 
who completed one-year follow-up interviews are included, whether or not they completed 
subsequent interviews. Individuals who did not marry during the observation period are right-
censored at the time of their last interview. Breslow’s method is used for handling ties. The 
Schoenfeld residuals method confirms that we were not violating the proportionality assumption. 
We tested the sensitivity of our results to various model specifications and sample restrictions. 
  Using event history models has several advantages: First, we do not have to choose an 
arbitrary time point at which to assess marital status and can determine the extent to which 
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TANF participation is associated with delays in marriage; second, we can be confident that our 
results are not driven by the effect of marriage on TANF participation (reverse causality). 
  By including measures of current and past TANF in our analyses, we are able to 
disentangle associations between TANF participation and marriage that are short-term (during 
the recipiency period only) and those that are long-term. Doing so also allows us to estimate the 
expected cumulative impact of TANF participation on marriage over the life course and to 
explore the underlying mechanisms.  
  Data limitations prevent us from modeling unobserved heterogeneity using simultaneous 
hazards procedures as Fitzgerald and Ribar did (we only observe one transition to marriage). 
However, we control for an extensive set of individual-level covariates and include city fixed 
effects that remove potential confounding effects of state policies and city-level characteristics 
that may affect both TANF participation and marriage. As indicated earlier, an analysis of 
selection effects in the Fitzgerald and Ribar study revealed that unobserved factors inflated their 
estimates of the effect of welfare participation on exits from headship by about 10 percent. Given 
that finding and our extensive set of controls, it seems reasonable to assume that our estimates of 
the effect of TANF participation on marriage are unlikely to be inflated by more than 10 percent. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of long-term TANF participation effects provides information about 
potential selection effects.  
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DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS  
Characteristics of mothers, by whether they ever participated in TANF between 1997 and 
their last interview, are presented in Table 2. Overall, a large proportion of the urban population 
of unmarried mothers is poor or near-poor (40 percent of mothers had less than a high school 
education, and 76 percent had births covered by Medicaid). However, there are notable 
differences between TANF participants and non-participants. Participants are less likely than 
non-participants to be non-Hispanic white, to have high educational attainment levels, to be 
immigrants, and to have been cohabiting with the baby’s father at the time of the birth. They are 
more likely to have had more than one child, to have relied on Medicaid to pay for the birth, and 
to have spent some time growing up in a household without both parents. 
  TANF participation rates in this sample are high, but the average duration of spells on 
TANF is relatively short. Fifty nine percent of the sample (1,899 out of 3,219 mothers) relied on 
TANF at any time between 1997 and when they were last interviewed (between 2003 and 2005 
for most mothers in the study). For this group, the average length of first TANF spell that 
occurred between the focal child’s birth and the mother’s last interview was 11 months.
9 
  As shown in the survival curve in Figure 1 for all mothers in the sample (the middle 
curve), marriage rates were relatively low and declined slightly over the observed period. 
Approximately 9 percent married within 12 months of the birth of the child. The percentages 
marrying each subsequent year were 5, 4, 4, and 3, respectively (from life table estimates). After 
five years, 75 percent of the sample remained unmarried. Marriage rates during this period varied 
considerably by TANF participation. Of those in the sample who received TANF at some point 
between 1997 and when they were last interviewed (upper curve), only 19 percent married 
                                                 
9 Six percent of participants were still on their first TANF spell when they were last interviewed so the actual 
average duration is somewhat longer. 
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within 5 years, compared to almost twice as many (35%) among those who were never on TANF 
(lower curve). As explained earlier, these differences could reflect marriage delays associated 
with current TANF participation, delays due to having been on TANF in the past, or 
characteristics (observed and unobserved) of mothers that are associated both with TANF 
participation and marriage behavior. 
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
  We estimated several sets of nested models. For each set, we show results from an 
unadjusted model, a model that adds only city fixed effects, a model that adds an extensive set of 
sociodemographic characteristics, and finally, a model that adds measures of family structure as 
a child, maternal health, and religiosity.
10 The first set of models, shown in Table 3, is the most 
comparable to the analyses of exits from headship by Fitzgerald and Ribar (2004). Specifically, it 
provides estimates of the effect of currently being on TANF on the likelihood of transitioning 
into marriage. The hazard ratio in Model 1 (.51) indicates that the likelihood of getting married 
while on TANF is about half that while not on TANF. This estimate changes little with the 
addition of city fixed effects (Model 2), indicating that policies or other characteristics of cities 
or states do not explain the association between current TANF participation and marriage. When 
controlling for the individual level covariates (Models 3 and 4), the hazard ratio associated with 
currently being on TANF increases to .69 but remains highly significant. This compares to a 
ratio of .65 from Fitzgerald and Ribar. The effects of individual covariates on the likelihood of 
marriage are consistent in direction with those obtained in prior studies of marriage. 
                                                 
10 We do not include the last set of measures in Model 3 because they are more likely than the other individual-level 
characteristics to be endogenous. 
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Table 4 shows estimates from models that include both current and past TANF 
participation. A comparison of the two coefficients provides an indication of the relative 
magnitude of short versus longer-term associations between TANF participation and marriage 
and allows us to evaluate the plausibility of hypothesized mechanisms. 
  Across all models, the coefficients of current TANF participation are similar to those in 
Table 3, which did not include the measure of past TANF participation. Controlling for 
individual level characteristics, the likelihood of marrying while on TANF is two thirds that of 
marrying while not on TANF and the effect of past TANF participation is close to 0 (hazard ratio 
in Model 4 is .94, p > .5). 
We ran several sets of supplementary models to assess the robustness of our results to 
alternative specifications and relevant subpopulations. First, we were concerned that the effect of 
past TANF receipt might be biased due to high collinearity with the measure of current TANF so 
we also estimated a set of models excluding the measure of current TANF participation. The 
estimates of the effect of past TANF participation in those models (not shown) were very similar 
to those in Table 4 (1.04, p = .64 in Model 4), confirming that past TANF plays no role in 
shaping marriage transitions.   
Second, we estimated sets of models in which the exit from TANF was lagged 1 month 
and by 3 months to test whether the effect of current TANF participation was capturing an effect 
of marriage (or marriage intentions) on participation.
11 The estimates (not shown in tables) were 
almost identical to those in Table 4. With a 1-month lag, the Model 4 estimates were .97 (p = 
                                                 
11 If a woman married during the last month she was on TANF, we cannot precisely time which came first. It is also 
possible that women who made decisions to marry while they were on TANF would leave welfare prior to marrying 
to avoid the appearance of having failed to reach the marriage bar described by Edin and Kefalas (2005) and Gibson, 
Edin, and McLanahan (2005). In both cases, the effects of current TANF participation would be overestimated and 
those of past participation would be underestimated. 
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.70) and .66 (p < .01), respectively, for past and current TANF participation and with a 3-month 
lag, the corresponding estimates were .98 (p = .87) and .68 (p < .01), respectively.  
  Third, we estimated models restricting the sample to various subpopulations. To further 
control for socioeconomic status, we estimated models for the subsample of mothers who were 
eligible for TANF during the year after their child’s birth,
12 mothers who had births paid for by 
Medicaid, and mothers who had at most a high school education. We also estimated models that 
restricted the sample to cases for which we had complete information on TANF participation 
dates to insure that the results were not sensitive to our imputations. The results of the subsample 
analyses are shown in Table 5. The hazard ratios for currently being on TANF (first and last 
columns) are slightly larger than those in Table 4, and for one subsample (eligible for TANF) it 
fails to reach statistical significance,
13 suggesting that a portion of the estimated effects of 
current TANF participation in the full sample might be due to selection of poor women into 
current TANF participation and out of marriage. However, the overall pattern is very similar to 
that in the full sample and the estimated effects of past TANF participation in all specifications 
are very close to 0 (likelihood ratios are close to 1 and not significant). 
The results from Table 4 and the supplementary analyses strongly suggest that the 
association between TANF participation and marriage does not extend past the recipiency 
period. It appears that once a mother is off of TANF, the likelihood of marriage reverts to that of 
mothers who have never been on TANF. 
 
                                                 
12 For details on the TANF eligibility imputation method, see the description of the inclusive imputation method in 
Reichman et al. (2004). 
13 The lack of significance is partly a function of the smaller sample size. 
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PROJECTED CUMULATIVE EFFECTS 
We used the results from Table 4 to project the effects of TANF participation on the 
probability of marriage and on the average delay in marriage over an 18-year period.
14 To do so, 
we applied the estimated participation effects to the expected number of years mothers would 
spend on TANF. This calculation required that we make some assumptions about the proportion 
of mothers who would eventually marry, the proportion who would ever participate in the TANF 
program, and the average length of TANF spells. The calculations also assume that the effects of 
TANF participation would be constant over an 18 year period and that there are no sleeper 
effects.
15 The assumptions and calculations are detailed in Appendix A. Based on our estimates 
of TANF participation effects and the ranges of assumptions we make, we project that TANF 
participation would decrease marriage rates by 3.7 to 4.9 percentage points over 18 years. That 
is, 61 to 62 percent of mothers who will have spent any time on TANF would marry within 18 
years of the birth compared to 66 percent of those who will not have participated in TANF. We 
also project that TANF participation would result in an average delay in marriage of 12 to 16 
months over the 18-year period. 
 
                                                 
14 We focused on an 18-year period, which corresponds to the period of time before which the focal child would 
reach majority age. It also would, on average, correspond to the period of TANF eligibility for that mother.  
15 We find it unlikely that there would be sleeper effects—that is, that the effects of TANF participation on marriage 
would not manifest themselves until several years after the TANF spell.  
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DISCUSSION 
We examined the extent to which TANF participation is associated with the likelihood 
and timing of marriage among mothers with young children who were born out of wedlock – a 
population of substantial policy interest. We did not address the much-studied question of 
whether welfare policies affect marriage (and if so, by how much); rather, we focused on the less 
explored question of how participation in TANF affects marriage probability and delay. This is 
the first and only study to assess both short and long-term effects of welfare participation on 
marriage—an important area of inquiry, as longer-term associations may be indicative of deep-
rooted changes in behavior. 
We found evidence that TANF participation has a negative effect on the likelihood of 
marriage, but that the effect is for the most part confined to the period of participation. We 
projected that the total effects would translate into modest differences in marriage rates over an 
18-year period and that TANF participation would result in marriage delays of up to 16 months 
over the child’s first 18 years. The projections are based on the assumption that there is little 
change since PRWORA in the average length of time spent on welfare. If substantially less time 
is spent on welfare under the restrictive new regime, then our projections are overestimates. 
Whether or not delays in marriage are harmful, on balance, to mothers and their children 
is not clear. On one hand, marriage is an important route out of poverty for many unwed mothers 
(Lichter, Graefe, and Brown 2003). Thus, delays in marriage may have detrimental effects on 
mothers’ and children’s economic well-being. On the other hand, marriage delays could have 
favorable effects on family stability by leading to more selective searches for mates, which could 
result in higher quality or longer-term relationships. 
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We described several potential mechanisms by which TANF participation could affect 
marriage. Our findings help to adjudicate between some of these. The significant negative effects 
of current welfare participation may reflect the expected loss of benefits from marrying or short-
term changes in values, psychological hardships, or stigma associated with welfare participation. 
They may also reflect a process whereby TANF participation, as a symbol of financial insecurity, 
limits a woman’s marriage prospects or places her below a self-imposed marriage bar, as 
suggested by Edin and Kafalas (2005) and Gibson, Edin and McLanahan (2005). Our results do 
not speak to the relative importance of specific short-term mechanisms, but they do provide 
evidence for such short-term explanations as a broad class.  
The minimal effects of TANF participation on marriage beyond the recipiency period do 
not support theories that presume long-term associations between the two behaviors. That is, 
they rule out scarring, values, culture of poverty, and other long-term explanations, including 
unobserved heterogeneity based on human capital or demographic characteristics.  
Our findings do not imply that poverty has little long-term effect on marriage. Any of the 
long-term mechanisms we have discussed could be important pathways by which poverty is 
associated with family structure. For example, values and culture may affect non-marital child 
bearing. Given that a non-marital birth occurs, however, the experience of relying on welfare 
may exert no incremental “culture of poverty” effect on marriage.  
We did not directly model selection into TANF. It is therefore possible that our estimates 
of the effects of TANF participation on marriage are biased upward, since most characteristics 
that are positively associated with welfare participation are negatively associated with marriage. 
Our estimates of past TANF participation are close to zero and not significant, however, 
suggesting that two of the three forms of selection that we discussed – socioeconomic and 
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normative – are not of concern. It is possible that selection on the basis of transient changes in 
circumstances does result in some bias. This scenario is consistent with our estimates restricting 
the sample to those eligible for TANF and the finding of Fitzgerald and Ribar (2004) that 
unobserved heterogeneity leads to upward biases in the estimated effects of current welfare 
participation on marriage. However, we expect this potential source of bias to inflate our 
estimates by no more than 10 percent (the estimate of the bias by Fitzgerald and Ribar), given the 
set of control variables we were able to include in our models. 
This study is subject to certain limitations. It is based on an exclusively urban sample. It 
is possible that TANF participation effects are different in rural, small town, or suburban 
communities. For example, if stigma associated with TANF participation is greater in non-urban 
settings, where TANF participation is less prevalent (Leonard and Kennedy 2001), the effects of 
TANF participation on marriage may be larger than those we estimated using the FF sample. 
Second, we extrapolated 18-year cumulative effects using only five years of data. The effects 
may not actually be uniform over the child’s first 18 years. Finally, our estimates of welfare 
participation effects are based solely on the post-1996 period. It is possible that long-term effects 
of participation existed under the former AFDC program. 
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Table 1. Potential Explanations of Association Between Welfare Participation and Marriage 






(there is an association between past 
welfare participation and marriage) 
Short-Term 
(there is no association between past 
welfare participation and marriage) 
Values  X   
Mental health  X  X 
Stigma X  X 
Economic incentives    X 
Selection (human capital)  X   
Selection (culture)  X   
Selection (disruption)    X 
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Table 2: Sample Characteristics By TANF Participation Status (Since 1997)       






    
Married to father or partner   18  32  24 
    
Non-Hispanic white  11  20  15 
    
Non-Hispanic black  66  41  55 
    
Hispanic 21  37  27 
    
Other race/ethnicity  2  3  3 
    
Less than high school  46  31  40 
    
High school graduate  34  33  34 
    
More than high school  20  36  26 
    
Born in U.S.  94  79  88 
    
Cohabited with father at baseline  40  59  48 
    
First birth  32  51  40 
    
Age >=20  75  79  77 
    
Medicaid birth  84  65  76 
    
Lived with both biological parents at age 15  29  46  36 
    
Good, very good, or excellent health at 
baseline 
90 93  91 
    
Attends religious services several 
times/month 
31 37  34 
    
Length of first TANF spell (months)  11  n.a.  n.a. 
    
N 1899  1320  3219 
    
 
WP05-24-FF   27  
 
 Table 3: Effect of Current TANF Participation on Hazard of Marriage   
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
      
Currently  on  TANF  0.51 0.54 0.69 0.69 
  (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Non-Hispanic black      0.52  0.50 
     (.00)  (.00) 
Hispanic     0.75  0.72 
     (.02)  (.01) 
Other race/ethnicity      0.76  0.75 
     (.23)  (.21) 
High school graduate      1.19  1.16 
     (.06)  (.12) 
More than high school      1.60  1.56 
     (.00)  (.00) 
Born in U.S.      0.67  0.73 
     (.00)  (.01) 
Cohabited with father at baseline      2.02  2.07 
     (.00)  (.00) 
First birth      0.96  0.96 
     (.59)  (.63) 
Age >=20      0.93  0.94 
     (.48)  (.52) 
Medicaid birth      0.92  0.94 
     (.35)  (.46) 
Lived with both biological parents at age 15        1.02 
      (.85) 
Good, very good, or excellent health at baseline      1.12 
      (.44) 
Attends religious services several  times/month      1.29 
      (.00) 
      
City fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
N  (3219)  154,067 154,067 154,067 154,067 
              
 Figures are proportional hazard ratios and p-values      
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Table 4: Effects of Past and Current TANF Receipt on Hazard of Marriage     
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
       
Received TANF in past  0.68  0.74  0.93  0.94 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.42) (0.52) 
Currently on TANF  0.45  0.48  0.67  0.67 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Non-Hispanic black      0.52  0.50 
     (0.00)  (0.00) 
Hispanic     0.75  0.73 
     (0.02)  (0.01) 
Other race/ethnicity      0.77  0.76 
     (0.24)  (0.22) 
High school graduate      1.19  1.16 
     (0.07)  (0.12) 
More than high school      1.59  1.55 
     (0.00)  (0.00) 
Born in U.S.      0.68  0.73 
     (0.00)  (0.01) 
Cohabited with father at baseline      2.01  2.06 
     (0.00)  (0.00) 
First birth      0.95  0.95 
     (0.51)  (0.57) 
Age >=20      0.93  0.94 
     (0.50)  (0.53) 
Medicaid birth      0.93  0.95 
     (0.42)  (0.52) 
Lived with both biological parents at age 15      1.01 
       (0.87) 
Good, very good, or excellent health at baseline      1.12 
       (0.44) 
Attends religious services several times/month      1.28 
       (0.00) 
       
City fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
N  (3219)  154,067  154,067 154,067 154,067 
Figures are proportional hazard ratios and p-values    
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Table 5:  Effects of TANF Participation on Hazard of Marriage (Sub-Samples) 
    
Sample: 








Table 3, Model 4  Correspond to Table 4, Model 4 
      
Eligible for TANF  0.80  1.05  0.81 
N = 1299  (.18) (.80)  (.27) 
      
      
Medicaid births  0.72  0.93  0.70 
N = 2438  (.01) (.49)  (.01) 
      
      
High school education or less  0.74  0.92  0.71 
N = 2370  (.02) (.47)  (.02) 
      
      
Non-imputed TANF dates  .76  1.09  .78 
N = 2890  (.03) (.42)  (.06) 
      
Figures are proportional hazard ratios and p-values      
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Figure 1:  Kaplan-Meier Unmarried Survival Estimates
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APPENDIX A. Projections of TANF participation effects on marriage over 18 years 
 
A. Assumptions about marriage rates 
We computed an expected marriage rate for our sample over an 18-year period by 
applying race/ethnic-specific marriage rates of women with non-marital births (from Graefe and 
Lichter 2002, which used the National Survey of Family Growth) to the composition of our 
sample. Graefe and Lichter estimated that 82% of whites, 62% of Hispanics, and 59% of black 
women with out-of-wedlock births will marry. Our sample is 15% white, 28% Hispanic, and 
54% black. We therefore obtain an estimated marriage rate of 62% over an 18-year period or an 
average marriage rate of 3.5% per year.  
 
B. Assumptions about amount of time spent on TANF 
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth from 1979 to 1996, Moffitt 
(2002) found that welfare recipients received AFDC for an average of 39 months over a 10-year 
period. The average amount of time on TANF is likely to be somewhat lower than what it was on 
AFDC because of the time limits and other restrictions under PRWORA and a stronger labor 
market. However, because Moffitt’s figures cover a shorter time period, we assumed 3 years (36 
months) as a lower bound and 4 years (48 months) as an upper bound figure for average amount 
of time on TANF over an 18-year period. 
Using the proportion of baseline unmarried mothers in our sample who were ever on 
TANF by the five year follow-up interview (.59) as a guide, we assumed 60% as a lower bound 
estimate of the percentage that will ever be on TANF over an 18 year period and 75% as an 
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upper bound estimate. This translates into an average of 10 to 17% of baseline unmarried 
mothers being on TANF in any given year. 
 
C. Annual marriage rates of participants and non-participants  
From our assumptions above (on average, 3.5% would marry each year over the 18 year 
period; 10-17% would be on TANF in a given year) and from the estimated effect of current 
TANF participation on marriage from Model 4 in Table 4 (.67), we estimate the proportion of 
TANF non-participants and TANF participants who will marry each year; we call these Mnt and 
Mt, respectively. Our estimate of the annual proportion of TANF non-participants who marry 
(Mnt) based on the assumption of 10% of mothers on TANF each year is calculated as follows: 
(1)  .035 = .67 Mnt *.10 + Mnt*.90 
Mnt = .0362  
Our estimate of the annual marriage rate of TANF non-participants (Mnt) based on the 
assumption of 17% of mothers on TANF each year is calculated as follows: 
(2)  .035 = .67 Mnt *.17 + Mnt *.83  
Mnt = .0371 
Since the .0362 and .0371 figures are so close, we use the mid-point, .0366, to derive the annual 
proportion of women on TANF who marry, as follows: 
(3) Mt = .0366 *.67 = .0245 
We assume that the effect of past TANF participation is 0 because in our main and 
supplementary models the estimates of past TANF are highly insignificant and the odds ratios 
are very close to 0. 
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D. Cumulative effect of TANF participation over 18 years  
  We calculate the expected marriage rate (within 18 years) of mothers who will never be 
on TANF (Cnt) as follows: 
(4)   Cnt = Mnt * 18 = .659  
and the expected marriage rate of mothers who will have been on TANF at some point (Ct) as 
follows: 
(5)(a)   Ct  = (Mt * 3) + (Mnt * 15) = .622 (assuming that women who participate in TANF will 
do so for an average of 3 years in total), or 
(5)(b)   Ct = (Mt * 4) + (Mnt * 14) = .610 (assuming that women who participate in TANF will 
do so for an average of 4 years in total ) 
 
V. Cumulative effect of TANF participation on marriage delay  
  To estimate the average delay in marriage, we divide (Cnt - Ct) by the percent of non-
TANF recipients who marry each year (Mnt). We obtain an estimate of marriage delay ranging 
from 1.01 to 1.34 years, or 12 to 16 months. 
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